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A PROPOSED REMEDY FOR THE DILEMMA
OF INNUMERABLE FUTURES: UKRAINE,
RUSSIA, AND NATO MEMBERSHIP
“Time forks perpetually toward innumerable futures.
In one of them I am your enemy.”1

INTRODUCTION

I

n the years following the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has faced
numerous political and social challenges as it strives toward selfdetermination.2 Many of these hardships can be directly attributed to its
tenuous relationship with an imposing geopolitical superpower in neighboring Russia.3 Efforts to gain independence and foster relationships
with Western states have been stymied by what some have called the
“Russian Factor” in Ukrainian zeitgeist.4 What has resulted from nearly
twenty years of a new Ukrainian regime is a pastiche of western ideals
and Russian nationalism, a nation striving to achieve recognition as an
independent force, but continually reverting to its status as a “younger
brother” to Russia.5 In an assertive move toward independence, Ukraine
was able to secure promises of territorial integrity and sovereignty when
it obtained Russia’s signature on the landmark Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership in 1997 (the “Friendship Treaty”).6 Now,
though, as Ukraine looks to take the next step in Westernizing its defense

1. Jorge Luis Borges, The Garden of Forking Paths, MICH. ALUMNUS Q. R., Spring
1958 (Donald A. Yates trans.), reprinted in LABYRINTHS 19, 28 (Donald A. Yates &
James E. Irby eds., 1964).
2. See generally Anka Feldhusen, The “Russian Factor” in Ukrainian Foreign Policy, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Fall 1999, at 119; John Morrison, Pereyaslav and After:
The Russian-Ukrainian Relationship, 69 INT’L AFF. 677, 682 (1993); Philip Chase, Note,
Conflict in the Crimea: An Examination of Ethnic Conflict Under the Contemporary
Model of Sovereignty, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 219 (1994) (discussing the problems
caused by Crimea in Ukraine after the fall of the Soviet Union).
3. See Morrison, supra note 2, at 682 (“Ukraine’s stake in the outcome of this
process of Russian self-definition is much higher than that of the other former Soviet
republics.”).
4. See Feldhusen, supra note 2, at 119 (arguing that Ukraine is in the process of
turning its back on Russia by establishing a view toward Western policies as evidenced
by four factors: the relationship with NATO; a stronger position with the Black Sea Fleet;
implementation of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership; and economic
policy).
5. Morrison, supra note 2, at 682.
6. Treaty Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on Friendship, Cooperation
and Partnership, Russ.-Ukr., May 31, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/52/174. [hereinafter Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership].
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mechanisms, many politicians and citizens from both States have raised
debate over whether Ukraine’s signature on the North Atlantic Treaty
would violate its obligations to Russia under the Friendship Treaty.7
While many writers have focused on the political and social ramifications of NATO membership, this Note aims to explore the legal ramifications as recognized by international treaty law if Ukraine were to accept
a bid to join the NATO military alliance.8 Fundamentally, for the treaties
to conflict there must be an established violation of international law.9
This statement begs the question whether an anticipatory breach10 of a
treaty gives rise to a material breach, and to what extent this breach invalidates an earlier treaty.11 Relying on the universally accepted treaty law
maxim pacta sunt servanda,12 this Note concludes that Ukraine-NATO
7. Friendship Between Russia and Ukraine Comes to an End, PRAVDA.RU, Jan. 1,
2008, http://english.pravda.ru/world/ussr/23-01-2008/103596-russia_ukraine-0 (Dmitry
Sudakov trans.); Oleg Shchedrov, Russia Warns Its Neighbors over NATO Ambitions,
REUTERS, Jun. 6, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL0643117820080606; David
L. Stern, Russian Actions Reignite Tensions over Strategic Port in Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 2008, at A6; Aleksandr Vatutin, Dragging Ukraine into NATO Shall Undermine
Friendship and Partnership Treaty with Russia, THE VOICE OF RUSSIA, June 17, 2008,
http://english.ruvr.ru/2008/06/17/198741.html.
8. See Anatoliy M. Zlenko, Foreign Policy Interests of Ukraine and Problems of
European Security, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 45 (1997) (discussing the political development and foreseeable political ramifications of Ukraine in Post-Soviet Europe, as well as
Ukraine’s developments with NATO); see also Friendship Between Russia and Ukraine
Comes to an End, supra note 7; Shchedrov, supra note 7; Stern, supra note 7; Vatutin,
supra note 7.
9. GUYORA BINDER, TREATY CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CONTRADICTION: THE
DIALECTIC OF DUPLICITY 28 (1988). Binder’s work on the Arab-Israeli conflict and his
examination of the various treaty obligations between the United States, Egypt, and the
Arab League is an inspiration for much of the reasoning and arguments in this Note.
Binder, however, analyzes treaty obligations in light of a theory that a treaty confers an
objective property right. Id. While this is an intriguing theory, it is not addressed in this
Note; meanwhile, the basic tenants of Binder’s argument are indeed relevant to this discussion.
10. Id. at 160 n.175 (“By anticipatory breach, I mean the doctrine that the formation
of a contract obligating one to violate an earlier contract under some future circumstance
is a wrong, mandating imposition of whatever sanctions ordinarily attend breach.”).
11. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 38 (2001) (“International law clearly recognizes the right of a State to terminate a treaty if another party has
breached its obligations under the agreement. Customary International law and VCLT
[,however, does not allow for termination] unless another party has materially breached a
provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of a treaty.”) (emphasis in the original, internal quotations and citations omitted).
12. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S
331, art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”); MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
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membership would require a renegotiation of the terms of the Treaty of
Friendship in order to avoid uncertainties that would arise inevitably in
the event of a conflict between Russia and a NATO ally.
Part I of this Note examines the basic theories of international law as
purported by legal positivists and political realists. Part II outlines the
fundamentals of international treaty interpretation. Part III provides
background on the political and legal complications of the relationship
between Russia and Ukraine. Part IV analyses the conflicting aspects of
the North Atlantic Treaty and the Treaty of Friendship, and juxtaposes
the conflict with a prior, similar dispute between Egypt, Israel, and Syria
in order to highlight the insufficiency of past efforts and identify remaining shortfalls. Then, finally, Part V evaluates prospective methods for
avoiding ambiguous treaty obligations in the future. Ultimately, this Note
argues that transparent, preemptive renegotiation of ambiguous obligations is the best path to establishing bright-line alliances between
Ukraine and Russia going forward.
I. BASIC PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Treaty law is, for the most part, noncontroversial.13 By definition, a
treaty is a written agreement between states, governed by international
law, conferring upon states certain legal rights and obligations.14 Because
treaties are governed by international law, their terms are subject to the
hierarchy of international laws of interpretation rather than the municipal
and domestic laws of their various member-states.15 Unlike domestic
law, sources of international law are not as readily identifiable.16 No international legislation or international court exists to issue binding legal
rules; the international court, for example, is not bound by the principle
LAW 9 (3d ed. 1999) (“[P]acta sunt servanda . . . express[es] the fundamental principle
that agreements, even between sovereign states, are to be respected.”).
13. REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 196 (1986)
14. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 2, sec. 1(a) (“‘treaty’ means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments . . . .”); JANIS, supra note 12, at 9; WALLACE, supra note 13, at 197.
But see South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 319, 402 (Dec. 21) (separate opinion of Judge Jessup). (“The notion that there is a clear and ordinary meaning of the word
treaty is a mirage.”).
15. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 12.
16. Keith G. Govern & Eric C. Bales, Taking Shots at Private Military Firms: International Law Misses Its Mark (Again), 32 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 55, 66 (2008) (“The
sources of international law are: (1) treaties, (2) customary international law, (3) jus cogens principles (“preemptory norms”) recognized by civilized nations, and (4) judicial
decisions of the International Court of Justice.”).
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of stare decisis.17 Therefore, the binding force of treaties is derived from
an implied good faith obligation—pacta sunt servanda (agreements are
to be respected).18 Treaty law, then, is largely self-regulating; to resolve
construction and interpretation disputes, one must look to other treaties
and customs of international practice.19
It is crucial to note that treaties have a dual nature.20 Each is a creature
of both political and legal intentions, borne out of a political process to
serve as a component of the system of international law.21 While the legal doctrine of treaty law may be relatively straightforward, myriad social and political factors can blur state obligations and make treaties
more difficult to interpret than other types of agreements.22 In analyzing

17. WALLACE, supra note 13, at 7 (“[O]n the international plane there is neither an
international legislature which passes international legislation, nor is there an international court to which all members of the international community must compulsorily submit.
Furthermore, the international legal system does not, unlike the majority of municipal
legal systems, possess a written constitution.”); see JANIS, supra note 12, at 8 (“Unlike a
domestic legal order, international law displays little procedural hierarchy. One or another court, one or another agency, one or another diplomatic settlement very often has no
accepted primacy over another.”).
18. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 26; see MALGOSIA
FITZMAURICE & OLUFEMI ELIAS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 3
(2005) (“In principle, treaty obligations comprise those international obligations that arise
directly by operation of the general principle of law embodied in the well-known maxim
pacta sunt servanda.”); JANIS, supra note 12, at 9; WALLACE, supra note 13, at 203
(“States are charged with performing and fulfilling their treaty obligations which are
binding in good faith—pacta sunt servanda is the maxim which expresses this basic canon of treaty observance.”).
19. WALLACE, supra note 13, at 7–8 (noting that the pragmatic response to questions
regarding the legal quality of international rules can be answered by looking at Article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and that to decide disputes which may
come before it, the Court is to apply treaties, customs, and general principles of international law before looking to judicial decisions and teachings); see also BINDER, supra
note 9, at 1 (discussing the interesting paradox about the nature of international law,
where sovereignty of nations is the source of its legitimacy but also its subject of constraint).
20.Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J.
1935, 2004 (2002) (noting that treaties have a dual nature “as instrumental and expressive
tools”).
21. SHIRLEY V. SCOTT, THE POLITICAL INTERPRETATION OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES
7 (2004); see also Scott M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty Interpretation, 86 TEX. L. REV.
777, 810 (2008) (“The nature of treaties as legal and political devices means that there are
compelling justifications for providing deference to executive judgments as to how they
operate and should be interpreted.”).
22. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 37. One commentator has elaborated on the consequences of the political factors that complicate treaty interpretation:
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the scope and application of a treaty, it is helpful to look at the intentions
of the parties when they entered into the agreement.23 However, because
treaties are borne of politics and law, it is difficult to separate legal from
political obligations.24 Moreover, further difficulty may arise during this
part of the analysis because constructions of legal and political obligations often overlap.25
Thus, to understand a given state’s intentions with respect to a treaty, it
is necessary to understand the two dominant schools of legal philosophy
in international law.26 Throughout the twentieth century, the doctrine of
legal positivism has developed significantly, 27 but notions of legal positivism in international law can be traced to the writings of Grotius, who
said, “[A]ll things are uncertain the moment men depart from law.”28 The
proliferation of international conventions, such as the United Nations, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the World Trade Organization,
evince the extent of support for this sentiment in the international arena.29 Arguably, the driving force behind these organizations is the shared
will to create a web of adherence—the desire for feasible enforcement,

Judicial actions that contravene executive foreign policy can harm national foreign policy and compromise the ability of the Executive to speak with one
voice. At the same time, treaties create obligations that are designed to have the
force of law with the implicit corresponding responsibility of the Judiciary to
provide meaning to that law. Treaties are not unilateral actions by the Executive; rather, they acquire the force of law through legislative review and consent. Unwarranted deference to executive treaty interpretations of instruments
purporting to limit executive actions and that are interpreted inconsistently
within the Executive Branch compromises separation-of-powers principles . . . .
See Sullivan, supra note 21, at 810–11.
23. See SCOTT, supra note 21, at 7.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 5 (“Assumptions that are internal to positivist legal analysis cannot be meaningfully transferred to explain political phenomena. Words take on a particular meaning
when used within the sub-system of international law.”).
26. See JANIS, supra note 12, at 6 (noting that the two types of international lawyers
are positivists and naturalists). In this paper, naturalist and realist are understood to be
interchangeable.
27. See generally JANIS, supra note 12, at 12; Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal
Positivism Reconsidered, 111 ETHICS 278 (2001).
28. MARTIN WRIGHT, FOUR SEMINAL THINKERS IN INTERNATIONAL THEORY 39 (Gabrielle Wright & Brian Porter eds., 2005) (internal citations omitted).
29. See U.N. Charter preamble, para. 3 (“[T]o establish conditions under which justice
and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law
can be maintained . . . .”). See generally John Norton Moore, Enhancing Compliance with
International Law: A Neglected Remedy, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 881 (1999) (arguing that the
basis of international law relies on compliance among states).
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made possible by threats of legal or economic sanctions against noncompliant state parties.30
Doctrinally, the philosophy of legal positivism argues that “legal rules
are valid only because they are enacted by an existing political authority
or accepted as binding in a given society, not because they are grounded
in morality or in natural law.”31 Eschewing the notion of rules grounded
in intangible concepts of morality, the theory relies on the belief that legal norms are separable from other norms in society.32 This feature is an
important facet of legal positivism that suggests certain norms exist because they are set in place by a legislature.33 From there it follows that
these legal norms “play a distinctive role in the practical reasoning of
citizens,” causing behavior to yield to legally proscribed boundaries.34
While this might seem obvious, the theory begins to lose force in the international arena.35 Unlike the sanctions imposed on a speeding motorist,
the sanctions imposed on a treaty violator are not easy to predict, and this

30. With regard to the WTO, see Chios Carmody, A Theory of WTO Law, 11 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 527, 555–56 (2008) One theory behind WTO law suggest a basic assumption
that “the principal purpose of WTO law is to protect expectations, that its subsidiary purpose is to adjust to realities, and that these two purposes interact to promote interdependence.” Id.; see also, Daniel C. K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW 52–53 (2008) (“Under the WTO system, . . . dispute settlement bodies have
no power to coerce nations to comply with its decisions. . . . The ultimate goal of the
WTO is to induce the offending member to bring its measures into conformity with the
WTO agreements.”). For the U.N., see sources cited supra note 29.
31. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 915 (8th ed. 2004).
32. Leiter, supra note 27, at 286.
33. S.G. Sreejith, Public International law and the WTO: A Reckoning of Legal Positivism and Neoliberalism, 9 SAN DIEGO INT’L. L.J. 5, 9–10 (2007) (providing an overview
of the development of legal positivism. The running thread through all these theories is
that law and morality are not connected, and legal validity is determined ultimately by
reference to social facts).
34. Leiter, supra note 27, at 286. Leiter explains:
[L]egal norms play a distinctive role in . . . [one’s] reasoning about what one
ought to do. If I say, for example, “Don’t go faster than 65 m.p.h. on the highway,” that may give you reasons for acting depending, for instance, on whether
you think I am a good driver, knowledgeable about the roads, sensitive to your
schedule, and the like. But when the legislatures issues the same proscription—
“Don’t go faster than 65 m.p.h. on the highway”—that adds certain reasons for
action that were not present when I articulated the same norm.
Id.
35. Martin V. Totaro, Legal Positivism, Constructivism, and International Human
Rights Law: The Case of Participatory Development, 48 VA. J. INT’L. L 719, 723 (2008)
(“Legal positivism in international law takes on a peculiar form when compared with
Austin and Hart’s respective formulations of what law is.”).
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uncertainty is magnified when parties agree to ambiguous resolution
provisions.36 In an international forum, the positivist doctrine is not supported by a hierarchy of legitimacy, but rather by a norm of agreeance
that the law is to be respected.37
In contrast to the positivist doctrine, legal realism adheres to the notion
that parties will act in their best interests because legal rules are often
indeterminate, and domestic law “is based, not on formal rules or principles, but instead on judicial decisions that should derive from social
interests and public policy.”38 The realist, for example, is in a better position to explain when cases with similar facts have different outcomes.39
With respect to case law, the realist does not go so far as to suggest that
judges are making up law—rather they are free to employ “equally legitimate, but conflicting, canons of interpretation,” which can result in the
indeterminacy of the contents of a rule.40 On an international scale, the
legal realist theory often manifests as the political realist—or, realpolitik—notion that international law lacks intrinsic power to prevent states
from acting when politics suggests a contrary course.41 Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger advocated this school of political
thought, arguing that a nation’s foreign policy should reflect its natural

36. BINDER, supra note 9, at 21. Binder refers to, but rejects, a positivist argument
that international law loses its legal character due to the absence of an international sovereign, and instead assumes that “international law can function as a legal system in the
presence of conditions fulfilling criteria of legitimacy recognizable to such participants.”
Id.
37. Id. at 21–22.
38. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 31, at 915; see also Leiter, supra note 27,
at 289. Leiter follows the “empirical rule skepticism” realist philosophy, as Hart illegitimated the conceptual rule skeptic theory.
39. See Leiter, supra note 27, at 288–89.
40. Id. at 295.
41. Ruti Teitel, Humanity Law: A New Interpretive Lens on the International Sphere,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 667, 671 (2008). Teitel points out:
[F]or realists, state power remains the fundamental category for explaining behavior in the international realm. The state continues to be the main actor in international relations and, therefore, realists question the degree to which there
may be significant substantive transformation in the relation international law
bears to the state-citizen relationship (for example, changes relating to the judicialization of the state) or any other citizen-collective relationship.
Id.; see SCOTT, supra note 21, at 3 (noting that a realist would say, for instance, a treaty is
a “mere scrap of paper”); see also BINDER, supra note 9, at 39 (noting, while not referring
to political realism explicitly, that “[a]s a practical matter, nations have rarely accorded
much authority to international law”).
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interests rather than its moral or legal ideals, should they conflict.42 To
the realist, what defines the scope of a treaty will raise political questions
regarding state power and state interests, rather than international legal
obligations.43
While many of the basic tenets of the realist approach are heavily refuted,44 one of the important points an international lawyer can take away
from it is the understanding that nations, when given the opportunity,
will act in their best interest and not necessarily for the betterment of the
international society.45 What the international legal system must strive
for, then, is a clear set of obligations that promote compliance and strike
against the notion that a nation will act solely in its best interest.46 Therefore, it is important that countries eliminate conflicting obligations in
order to avoid unforeseeable legal consequences when they are called
forth to fulfill those obligations as required in the treaty framework.47
Otherwise, when left free to employ conflicting means of interpretation,

42. C.G. Schoenfeld, Book Review, 15 POL. PSYCHOL 579, 580 (1994) (reviewing
WALTER ISAACSON, KISSINGER: A BIOGRAPHY (1992)).
43. See Totaro, supra note 35, at 721.
44. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 9.
Myth #4: No one obeys international law. This is the ultimate, realist critique of international law and relations. It depends on a utilitarian and rationalist
attitude that States and other international actors conduct themselves only out
of self-interest. . . .
This myth raises the most fundamental question in international law: what is
the basis of obligation in international affairs, or, put even more simply, Why
do States obey international law? . . . States and other international actors do,
indeed, follow international law norms out of self-interest. But that self-interest
is expressed as more than a situational observance of a particular rule at a particular time. Instead, nations have a self interest in promoting a systemic rule of
law in international relations, a “culture” of law observance. . . .
Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law
and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.
LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (1979).
BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 9.
45. See Moore, supra note 29, at 884 (“[T]he greatest weakness of the contemporary
international system is not the absence of authoritative norms, or underlying intellectual
understanding about the need for such norms, but rather the all-too-frequent absence of
compliance.”).
46. Id. at 884–85.
47. See Christopher J. Borgen, Resolving Treaty Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L.
REV. 573 (2005). “The viability of international law, as a legal system, rests largely on
the viability of treaties as a source of law.” Id. at 573.
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a nation can justify acts that may run counter to the true purpose of a
treaty.
II. TREATY ANALYSIS
When States enter into treaties and abide universal agreements, conflicts in obligations are inevitable.48 Having registered the Friendship
Treaty with the United Nations,49 Russia and Ukraine normally would
have submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”) for treaty dispute resolutions.50 However, during negotiations for
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), the former
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics made a reservation about submitting
to the ICJ for such resolutions.51 It is therefore unclear whether post-

48. Id.
49. Russia and Ukraine registered the Friendship Treaty pursuant to Article 102 of the
U.N. Charter.
50. Fewer than five cases have ever been brought before the International Court of
Justice to determine if a treaty has been breached.
51. Moore, supra note 29, at 915–16. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics included the following reservations and declaration in the instrument of accession to the
VCLT:
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not consider itself bound by
the provisions of article 66 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
and declares that, in order for any dispute among the Contracting Parties concerning the application or the interpretation of articles 53 or 64 to be submitted
to the International Court of Justice for a decision, or for any dispute concerning the application or interpretation of any other articles in Part V of the Convention to be submitted for consideration by the Conciliation Commission, the
consent of all the parties to the dispute is required in each separate case, and the
conciliators constituting the Conciliation Commission may only be persons appointed by the parties to the dispute by common consent.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will consider that it is not obligated
by the provisions of article 20, paragraph 3 or of article 45 (b) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, since they are contrary to established international practice.
. . . [I]t reserves the right to take any measures to safeguard its interests in
the event of the non-observance by other States of the provisions of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Accession to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, USSR, Apr. 29, 1986, 1425
U.N.T.S 441, 441–42. It is important to note that this reservation applies to the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, and therefore encompasses both Russia and Ukraine today.
United Nations Treaty Collection, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&c
hapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en#EndDec (last visited April 8, 2010).
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Soviet states would find themselves before the ICJ for treaty interpretation disputes.52 Regardless, this Note applies rules derived from ICJ decisions in an effort to advance a scholarly approach to resolving this treaty
dispute, as ICJ decisions generally reflect the international understanding
of treaty interpretation.53
In discussing treaty interpretation, the most appropriate place to begin
is the VCLT, which is “quite literally, a treaty on treaties.”54 Treaty interpretation should begin with the default rules set forth in the Convention.55 The VCLT’s conflict provisions are “applicable when supposedly
conflicting treaties are successive and related to the same subject matter.”56 This gives the VCLT broad jurisdiction, as there are many subjects
that a single treaty can affect—the term “subjects” can refer to the “subject matter of the relevant rules or the legal subjects bound by it.”57 The
notion of conflict, then, is interpreted broadly due to the many factors
and obligations that affect the scope and application of a treaty.58 Therefore, the first step is to analyze the legal norms set forth in an agreement
52. Moore, supra note 29, at 915.
53. FITZMAURICE & ELIAS, supra note 18, at xiv (“The recent jurisprudence of the ICJ
has also contributed to the development and clarification on a number of aspects of the
law of treaties.”).
54. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 26; ARIE E. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY
TERMINATION 159 (1975) (“Thus it is no surprise that the [International Law Commission], in drafting the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, tried to judicialize treaty
termination.”); FITZMAURICE & ELIAS, supra note 18, at xiii (“Even the functioning of
treaties themselves is regulated to a significant extent by a treaty, the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties.”); see JANIS, supra note 12, at 17 (“Since the Vienna Convention
is largely, though not entirely, a codification of the existing customary international law
of treaties, it constitutes a useful depository of international legal rules even for countries,
like the United States, which are not yet parties to it.”).
55. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J 161, 237 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion of
Judge Higgins) (“It is commonplace that treaties are to be interpreted by reference to the
rules enunciated in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which
Article is widely regarded as reflecting general international law.”).
56. See Borgen, supra note 47, at 603 (internal citations omitted).
57. Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, at 17
(Apr. 13, 2006) (finialized by Martti Koskenniemi).
58. Borgen, supra note 47; see also Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 57, at 19 (“This
report adopts a wide notion of conflict as a situation where two rules or principles suggest
different ways of dealing with a problem.”); FITZMAURICE & ELIAS, supra note 18, at 4–5
(“Treaties are one of the sources which give rise to international legal obligations. . . .
‘[T]here is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is
not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or
character.’”) (internal citations omitted); SEYED ALI SADAT-AKHAVI, METHODS OF
RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN TREATIES 5–23 (2003).
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as composed of subjects and predicates in order to illustrate what the rule
is “about,” and what assertions are made regarding the scope.59 In defining the scope, one must determine whether or not the norm is mandatory
or permissive.60 Mandatory norms impose an obligation, while permissive norms provide for the freedom to do or to not do something.61 Once
the scope of a norm has been properly delineated, obligations can be seen
as either overlapping, completely identical, or disjointed.62
Determining the subject matter of a treaty provision can include considerations of sources outside the treaty.63 Providing guidance for analysis, the VCLT’s treaty-conflict provision includes three theories for treaty interpretation: textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism.64 Article
31 of the VCLT states:
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose.65

Initially, the VCLT prescribes a preference for textualism in the phrase
“ordinary meaning given to the terms.”66 This directs the reader to begin
by looking at the words of a provision as they are commonly understood,
without taking outside sources into account.67 The words of the treaty
59. See SADAT-AKHAVI, supra note 58, at 14 (diagramming the complex scopes of
various norms). For an example, see Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 57, at 17–18:
A treaty on, say, maritime transport of chemicals, relates at least to the law of
the sea, environmental law, trade law, and the law of maritime transport. The
characterization has less to do with the “nature” of the instrument than the interest from which it is described.
. . . But there are no such classification scheme. . . .
. . . The criterion of “same subject-matter” seems already fulfilled if two different rules or sets of rules are invoked in regard to the same matter, or if, in
other words, as a result of interpretation, the relevant treaties seem to point to
different directions in their application by a party.
Id.
60. SADAT-AKHAVI, supra note 58, at 5.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 17.
63. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 33–36.
64. WALLACE, supra note 13, at 204 (“The Vienna Convention adopts an integrated
approach to interpretation, but nevertheless gives emphasis to the ordinary meaning approach.”); BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 34 (noting that there are three “schools” or approaches to treaty interpretation codified into the VCLT).
65. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 31, sec.1.
66. Id; BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 34; WALLACE, supra note 13, at 204.
67. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 34.
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form the “foundation for the interpretive process,” and an interpreter
must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty.68 However,
skillful lawyers can usually assign ambiguity to seemingly straightforward phrases when a state asserts a particular construction to gain advantage in international relations.69 To assist with the strict reading of the
text, subsections (2) and (3) of Article 31 list the specific documents an
interpreter may take into account in order to deduce the “meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light if its object and purpose.”70 The VCLT provides:
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty;
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in
[connection] with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by
the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.71

Additionally, Article 31(4) stipulates that, where parties claim to have
assigned a “special meaning” to a term, interpreters shall recognize that

68. Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, sec. D,
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DSO/AB/R, WT/11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996).
69. James D. Fry, Legitimacy Push: Towards a Gramscian Approach to International
Law, 13 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 307, 330 (2008) (“Article 31 . . . leaves the
door open for dominant states to push for political interpretations that best serve their
own interests.”); BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 34 (2001) (“If words always had fixed and
determinable meaning for every circumstance, then one would have no need for interpretation—nor for lawyers, for that matter.”).
70. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 31; BEDERMAN,
supra note 11, at 35.
71. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 31.
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meaning if “it is established that the parties so intended.”72 Furthermore,
while not explicitly stated, the reference to “object and purpose” has
been understood as directing interpreters to employ a “teleological” approach.73 Teleological interpretation gives relevance to the fundamental
reason or problem the treaty was supposed to address.74 Therefore, after
establishing the ordinary meaning of a term, an interpreter should examine the above-referenced documents and consider the overall purpose
of the agreement.
If the interpreter has applied the Article 31 framework and the meaning
of a term is “ambiguous or obscure” or leads to a result that is “manifestly absurd or unreasonable,” additional documents may be considered to
determine the intentions of the parties.75 Article 32 of the VCLT states
that, in order to deduce the parties’ intentions, an interpreter may take
into account “supplemental means of interpretation, including preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.”76 The
phrase “circumstances of conclusion” is generally understood to permit
the examination of the “historical background against which the treaty
was negotiated.”77 While some commentators have called into question
the fairness of looking at negotiation history, the use of such documents
has “become a constant feature of interpretive disputes over treaties.”78
As a result, while sources that shed light on the parties’ intentions take a
subordinated role to the plain text of the treaty, they are often brought
into the interpretive process due to the ease with which a given term can
be labeled ambiguous.79
72. Id. at art. 31(4).
73. Fry, supra note 69, at 70.
74. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 35.
75. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, ¶ 86, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R
(June 5, 1998); JANIS, supra note 12, at 30–31; see WALLACE supra note 13, at 205 (“If
giving the ordinary meaning to the terms of the treaty would lead to an ambiguous or
obscure meaning, or would produce a manifestly absurd and unreasonable approach,
supplementary means of interpretation may be invoked.”); BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at
35.
76. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 35.
77. European Communities – Custom Classification of Certain Computer Equipment,
supra note 75, at ¶ 86.
78. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 35
79. EDWARD SLAVKO YAMBRUSIC, TREATY INTERPRETATION: THEORY AND REALITY
171–72 (1987). On brining in other interpretive methods, Yambrusic has said:
The apparent preference for the primacy of text, moreover, reflects the
predominant influence of the Continental approach over an Anglo-Sazon view .
...
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Ultimately, the aim of analysis is to find not just a conflict between obligations, but one that rises to the level of a material breach80 per Article
60 of the VCLT:
1. A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles
the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or
suspending its operation in whole or in part.
....
3. A material breach of a treaty, for purposes of this article, consists in:
....
(b) The violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.81

Because a treaty can have multiple purposes, it is well-settled that a
breach must offend a main object or purpose of the agreement.82 Accordingly, a minor breach of a major purpose is likely more significant than
a major breach of a minor purpose.83 All in all, the Convention sets forth
an understanding that there are instances where “a degree of such violation [justifies] termination or suspension, and that the touchstone of that
degree is that the provision violated should be essential to the accomplishment of the treaty’s object and purpose.”84
Once a material breach has been established, it is generally accepted
that the other party may repudiate the treaty and unilaterally initiate a

The International Law Commission, through what appears to be a delicate
mixture of lex late and de lege feranda, had striven to give legal character to
what in judicial experience denotes “historicity of subjectivity.” . . . According
to Sir Humphrey, “the concept [of the ordinary meaning] must in his view always be related to the context . . . .
Id. (alteration in the original, internal citations omitted).
80. Moore, supra note 28, at 885–936. Moore illustrates in a comprehensive review
of the drafting history of Article 60 of the Vienna Convention and subsequent legal
commentaries that, while it is uncertain what a trivial breach may give rise to, a material
breach by either party in a bilateral treaty gives the nonbreaching party the right to terminate the treaty in whole or in part. Id.
81. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 60; FITZMAURICE
& ELIAS, supra note 14, at 125–26 (noting that the determination of “object and purpose”
of the treaty is the difficult issue in determining whether there has been a material breach
for Article 60 requirements).
82. Moore, supra note 29, at 920–21.
83. See id.
84. Military and Parliamentary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 250 (June 27) (dissenting opinion of Judge Oda).
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peaceable reprisal.85 Normally, “[Grounds] for invalidating, terminating,
withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty . . . may be invoked only with respect to the whole treaty,”86 but some legal scholars
believe that a state may initiate a peaceable reprisal in the event that a
breaching party has materially breached an important portion of the treaty.87 This notion, though, is much easier to apply with treaties that deal
with commerce, and it is difficult to see how one could severally repudiate the Friendship Treaty.88
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS
In an effort to understand the intent behind treaties between Russia and
Ukraine, it is critical to examine the history of agreement between these
two nations.89 The Pereyaslav Agreement of 1654 marks a defining moment in Russia-Ukraine relations that shaped the subsequent three centuries of foreign policy and law between the two States.90 While history has
blurred the details of the agreement, it is understood that Ukraine sought
protection from the Poles and turned to Russia for military assistance.91
After signing the agreement, Ukraine expected to engage in a bilateral
military alliance but found itself pledging a unilateral oath of loyalty to
the Russian tsar.92 The years following the agreement were marked by
Ukrainian hardship, famine, and oppression, resulting in a general skepticism toward promises from Moscow.93 While the Pereyaslav Agreement had many longstanding effects on Russian-Ukrainian relations, the
most significant is the fear among Ukrainian citizens that “any deal with
Russia is a potential trap, however favourable to Ukraine its terms might

85. T. O. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 114 (1974) (“It is generally agreed
that the breach of a treaty obligation by one party entitles the other party to retaliate by
means of peaceable reprisals.”); see also Moore, supra note 29, at 910.
86. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 44.
87. Moore, supra note 29, at 885–93.
88. Treaties that relate to commerce between nations generally have quantifiable
subject matter: a ton of barley, or a cargo of wheat. In contrast, a treaty that defines human rights is not so severable. See BINDER, supra note 9, at 31.
89. Morrison, supra note 2, at 677–78.
90. Id. at 679.
91. Alexander Biryukov, The Doctrine of Dualism of Private Law in the Context of
Recent Codifications of Civil Law: Ukrainian Perspectives, 8 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP.
L. 53, 55 n.5 (2002); see also Press Release, Ukrainian World Congress, Pereyaslave
Treaty—Statement on Observance of the Pereyaslav Treaty of January 1654 (July 3,
2002), http://www.artukraine.com/old/historical/pertreaty.htm.
92. Biryukov, supra note 91, at 55 n.5; Morrison, supra note 2, at 682.
93. Morrison, supra note 2, at 679–80.
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appear.”94 These sentiments continued to manifest throughout the twentieth century under the oppressive rule of Joseph Stalin, reinforcing the
Ukrainian inferiority complex with respect to Russia.95
However, to regard Russia’s relationship with Ukraine as solely oppressive would be to disregard the notion held by many Russian leaders
and philosophers that Ukraine is an integral part of the Russian dynasty—a State coexisting with Russia, following the same worldly mission
and preserving similar social ideologies.96 Kiev, for many Russians, was
the “birthplace of the Russian nation . . . [where] Russians adopted
Christianity.”97 The notion that Ukraine is a “younger brother” to Russia
may be seen as a Russian understanding that the two States coexist, and
the boundaries that have developed are purely artificial and evidence of a
failure to understand that “Russia is a larger concept than the territory
within the borders of the Russian Federation.”98 From this angle, one can
begin to understand the motivation for Russia to enter into agreements
where Ukraine garners sovereignty but not total independence; to some
Russian nationalists, an “independent Ukraine” would be a contradiction
of terms.99
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine found itself in an all too
familiar setting. Meeting in the town of Pereyaslav-Khmelnytsky,100
leaders from Russia and Ukraine set an example for surrounding territories by becoming two of the original parties to the Commonwealth of
Independent States (“CIS”).101 Ostensibly, the document recognized
Ukrainian independence and renounced the Pereyaslav agreement, but
the years following the signing were marked by Russian influence and

94. Id. at 680.
95. See Morrison, supra note 2, at 679; Press Release Ukrainian World Congress,
supra note 91.
96. John Edwin Mroz & Oleksandr Pavliuk, Ukraine: Europe’s Linchpin, FOREIGN
AFF., May/Jun 1996, at 52, 52 (“Much of the Russian political spectrum, obsessed with
reclaiming great power status and reuniting the former Soviet republics, recognizes that
Ukraine is the key to its plans and openly espouses reabsorption.”); see also Morrison,
supra note 2, at 681.
97. Dmitri K. Simes, America and the Post-Soviet Republics, FOREIGN AFF., Summer
1992, at 73, 82.
98. Id. at 682.
99. Id. at 681.
100. Pereyaslav-Khmelnytsky is the town named after the aforementioned Pereyaslav
Agreement and its Ukrainian cosigner, Hetman Khmelnytsky.
101. Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, opened for
signature Dec. 8, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 143 (1992).
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reluctance to accept what was widely regarded as an unacceptable, polarizing mandate by then Russian President Boris Yeltsin.102
Largely due to the confusion expressed by Russian nationals toward
the ramifications of the CIS, Ukraine spent subsequent years advocating
a new, more explicit treaty for Russia to recognize borders and Ukrainian
independence.103 Thus, in 1997, the two parties entered into the Friendship Treaty.104 The Friendship Treaty outlines reciprocal obligations for
explicit recognition of Ukraine’s sovereignty and self-determination, but
there are numerous factors that call into question the true sentiment behind Russia’s assent.105 When the presidents of the two countries met in
Kiev, they discussed a number of matters, but the primary Russian objective was to reach a deal on a lease for the naval port in Sevastopol, a
Ukrainian municipality located on the Black Sea.106 Until these negotiations, Russia had continually stalled talks about the Friendship Treaty,
and only once the lease was agreed upon did both parties make any
progress toward its execution.107 The importance of the lease is highlighted by its annexation to the Friendship Treaty when it was submitted and registered with the UN.108
As early as 1991, relations between NATO and Ukraine began to take
shape as the country sought a new identity in a post-Soviet world.109
However, at the 1997 signing of the Friendship treaty, it was unclear

102. Feldhusen, supra note 2, at 126–28 (noting that later agreements and Russian
sentiment muddied the obligations of the Ukraine-Russia relationship in the subsequent
years)Morrison, supra note 2, at 682, 684.
103. Feldhusen, supra note 2, at 126–27 (“President Kuchma compared the signing of
the treaty to cutting the umbilical cord between the two countries.”).
104. See Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, supra note 6.
105. Feldhusen, supra note 2, at 126–28.
106. Id. The delays in ratification of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership only gave way once Ukraine agreed to ratify the agreements of the Black Sea
Fleet. Michael Specter, Setting Past Aside, Russia and Ukraine Sign Friendship Treaty,
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1997, at 1.13 (noting that the negotiations were postponed because
of “tensions over the future of the Black Sea Fleet.”); The Secretary-General, Report of
the Secretary-General on Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Law of the Sea, ¶ 371, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/52/487 (Oct. 20, 1997) [hereinafter Law of
the Sea] (“The conclusion of the Agreements resolved the problem of ownership of the
former Soviet Black Sea Fleet . . . . These and other agreements made it possible for the
Presidents of the two countries to sign a comprehensive Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership . . . .”).
107. Feldhusen, supra note 2, 126–28.
108. Law of the Sea, supra note 106, ¶ 371–72.
109. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO’s Relations with Ukraine, http://
www.nato.int/issues/nato-ukraine/topic.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2010).
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whether Ukraine would continue to pursue NATO membership.110 Questions about its intentions were answered when Ukraine formally signed
the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership in July of 1997, which established the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Kiev.111 In the following
years, Ukraine contributed military forces to NATO-led operations and
continued to engage NATO on a yearly basis with updates and reports as
it progressed toward satisfying the NATO requirements for membership.112 In recent years, Ukraine has become the focus of U.S. efforts to
increase NATO membership, and, as recently as September 2008, U.S.
officials have visited Kiev to affirm that “Washington ha[s] a deep and
abiding interest in Ukraine’s security.”113
While this Note focuses largely on the legal issues raised by NATO
membership, politics and law are often closely intermingled on the international stage,114 thus it is necessary to illustrate some of the political
hurdles as well.115 In recent years, rifts within Ukraine’s government and
general population make NATO membership seem unlikely in the near
future.116
110. See Specter, supra note 106 (quoting Volodimyr Horbulin, Ukraine’s top military
official, as stating, “Ukraine is not going to join NATO now, and there are no conditions
for that.”). Note, however, that in an accompanying declaration to the submission of the
Friendship Treaty to the United Nations, it was stated that “the Presidents consider that
the instruments on relations between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and between Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization safeguard the national interests of their countries and contribute to the strengthening of security and stability in European and Atlantic region.” Russian-Ukrainian Declaration,
Russ.-Ukr., May 31, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/52/174. While this provision likely opens the
door for Ukraine to engage NATO, years of new leadership in Russia have altered the
sentiments toward NATO that former President Boris Yeltsin may have held in 1997.
Regardless, this Note does not consider whether Ukraine is allowed to join NATO, but
whether such a treaty would present obligations that conflict with Ukraine’s present obligations to cooperate in a military effort with Russia.
111. GERALD B. SOLOMON, THE NATO ENLARGEMENT DEBATE, 1990–1997, BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 120 (1998); North Atlantic Treaty Organization, supra note 109.
112. Grigoriy M. Perepelytsia, NATO and Ukraine: At the Crossroads, NATO REV.
(2007), http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue2/english/art2.html.
113. See Judy Dempsey, U.S. Presses NATO on Georgia and Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES.
Nov. 25, 2008, at A8; Steven Lee Myers & Alan Cowell, Cheney Pledges Support for
Ukraine, NY.TIMES.COM., Sept. 6, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com.
114. See SCOTT, supra note 21, at 1–25.
115. Id. (noting that focusing solely on the legal aspects of a treaty would mean neglecting its broader application in the international political sphere).
116. Brian Knowlton & Judy Dempsey, Rice Defends Stance on 2 States’ NATO Push,
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 27, 2008, at 3 (quoting U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice as stating, “Georgia and Ukraine are not ready for [NATO] membership . . . . That is
very clear.”).
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In 2004, democratic elections were held in Ukraine and resulted in the
installation of a pro-Moscow regime led by Viktor Yanukovich as Prime
Minister.117 The legitimacy of the election was hotly contested, and the
successful Orange Revolution in 2004 took Yanukovich out of power
and replaced him with the pro-Western Viktor Yuschenko as President
and Yulia Tymoshenko as Prime Minister.118 Despite the rise of a proWestern government, however, the President and Prime Minister failed
to cooperate in efforts toward NATO membership and engaged in infighting that ulitmately stalled progress toward satisfying NATO requirements.119 Then, with many commentators criticizing the Orange
Revolution beneficiaries for poor leadership and ineffective governing,
Yanukovich managed to reclaim power in the 2010 presidential election.120
While Yanukovich’s return to power clearly signals a “pro-Moscow
tilt,” his campaign focused on refashioning his image as the type of leader who will not only advance the values of the Orange Revolution but
also mend ties with the Kremlin.121 Furthermore, the recent election carries with it a collateral, more important message that Ukraine has persisted as a democracy, moving away from elections that have “hardly
been free and fair.”122
117. See Clifford J. Levy, Orange Revolution Parties Will Share Power in Ukraine,
N.Y.TIMES.COM, Oct. 15, 2007, at A3.
118. Clifford J. Levy, Power Struggle in Ukraine Strains Governing Alliance, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4 2008, at A16.
119. For an indepth look at the Orange Revolution, see generally Natalie Prescott,
Note, Orange Revolution in Red, White, and Blue: U.S. Impact on the 2004 Ukrainian
Election, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 219 (2006)
120. Gideon Rachman, Oranges and Lemons in Ukraine, FIN. TIMES, at 11 (“Over the
past six years, during the Yushchenko presidency, Ukraine has been democratic and prowestern—but badly governed. The average Ukrainian now yearns for better government,
which accounts for the backlash against the ineffective Mr. Yushchenko.”).
121. Mary Dejevsky, Ukraine is at Last Throwing off the Shackles of the Cold War,
THE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 9, 2010, at 32 (“But the many different roads of disillusionment
with the Orange Revolution do not lead automatically back to Moscow. What has been
the most striking, and most hopeful, about the 2010 election is the extent to which it has
not been a contest between West and East, either globally, or within Ukraine.”).
122. Peter C. Ordeshook, Constitutions, Elections, and Election Law, 87 TEX. L. REV.
1595, 1604; see Clifford J. Levy, For Moscow, Victory with a Catch; Winner of Ukraine
vote favors Russia, but Contest Didn’t Follow its Script, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 10,
2010, at 2. According to Levy:
[Yanukovich’s victory] may be a relief to Vladimir V. Putin, but the election
was competitive and relatively fair, the kind of race that has not been held in
Russia under Mr. Putin.
While [Ms. Tymoshenko, defeated Prime Minister,] might indicate a rejection
of the [Orange] [R]evolution, the fact that the country carried out a contentious
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Similarly, Ukraine’s citizens have divided on the NATO issue.123 Recent polls show that 52% of Ukrainians would vote against joining
NATO, while only 22% would vote in favor of membership.124 Still, proNATO government officials insist that the statistics are not a perfect picture of public sentiment, as much of Ukraine’s population is greatly uninformed as to what NATO membership entails (many think, for instance,
that NATO membership would involve nuclear weapon deployment on
Ukrainian territory), and harsh words from Moscow have swayed many
citizens’ sentiments.125 Furthermore, residents of key Ukrainian territories, such as Crimea, have demographics with strong ties to Russia, and
these allegiances have stymied NATO progress.126 While the recent presidential election effectively ousted the Orange government, effective leadership, democratic elections, and a core of pro-Western voters could set
Ukraine on a more effective path towards E.U. and NATO membership.127
IV. IDENTIFYING A CONFLICT
In order for an official “conflict” to exist, the two treaties at issue must
have a similar object or purpose.128 This VCLT rule is reflected in the
nonconflict provision of the North Atlantic Treaty:
Each party declares that none of the international engagements now in
force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into
any international agreement in conflict with this Treaty.129
presidential election that was widely considered fair suggested that the Orange
legacy had endured.
Id.; see also Dejevskly, supra note 121 (“In this election there was no high-profile electioneering by Russia or by the United States. . . . Above all, though, this was an election
between Ukrainians, not cold-war proxies, campaigning on Ukrainian issues.”).
123. Judy Dempsey, NATO Examines Ukraine’s Readiness to Join—Strong Opposition
Seen from Russia, INT’L HERALD TRIB., June 16, 2008, at 3.
124. Id. (statistics from the Independent Democratic Initiatives Foundation in Kiev).
125. Dempsey, supra note 123.
126. For an account of the tensions existing between Ukraine and Crimea, see Chase,
supra note 2.
127. Clifford J. Levy, For Kremlin, Ukraine Vote Cuts 2 Ways, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
2010, A1 (“[W]hile the public ousted the Orange government, . . . it did not want to do
away with all aspects of the Orange democracy. [Other analysts] said a backlash would
occur if Mr. Yanukovich tried to crack down.”); Luke Harding Kiev, International Observers Hail Ukraine Election as Fair, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 9, 2010, at 20 (“Ukraine’s
chances of joining the EU had been significantly enhanced, the observers noted.”).
128. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 30; see also
Borgen, supra note 47, at 603.
129. North Atlantic Treaty art. 8, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
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Meanwhile, this comparable clause is found in the Friendship Treaty:
Each High Contracting Party shall refrain from participating in, or supporting, any actions directed against the other High Contracting Party,
and shall not conclude any treaties with third countries against the other Party.130

Here, there are two explicit scenarios for a conflict. For Ukraine, becoming a party to the North Atlantic Treaty may constitute “conclud[ing]
a treaty with third countries” against Russia. This will depend largely on
the scope of the phrase “against the other Party” and whether the mere
potential for a breach, absent an overt act, would justify repudiation. The
second issue is whether the Friendship treaty could constitute an international agreement in conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty. The Friendship treaty describes Ukraine and Russia as neighborly allies maintaining
a cooperative front to ward off hostile measures against either state; a
role that could be compromised if Ukraine joins a military alliance to
which Russia is not a signatory.131 Therefore, in order to determine if
there is a conflict, it becomes necessary to use the VCLT rules of treaty
interpretation.132
A treaty conflict can occur “when a state concludes a treaty that creates
international obligations the performance of which would be inconsistent
with the performance of an international obligation to a third state under
a previously concluded treaty.”133 When looking for a conditional breach
that can occur in the future, the analysis of a potential conflict aims to
identify the presence of an anticipatory breach.134 On a domestic level,
jurisdictions such as the United States have defined procedures for addressing an anticipatory breach.135 However, on the international level,
130. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, supra note 6, art. 6 (emphasis
added).
131. See id.
132. See supra text accompanying note 76.
133. BINDER, supra note 9, at 7.
134. Borgen, supra note 47, at 627–28. Borgen states:
Much attention has focused on whether the law on treaties encompasses a
norm of anticipatory breach . . . . Current analysis does not address the problem
of treaty conflicts in these terms; as such it is not a developed norm. Based on
analogies from the domestic cases of contractual conflicts, however, the idea of
anticipatory repudiation is a useful one, as it focuses attention on the underlying goals of each treaty. This, in turn, urges a more systematic inquiry into the
interrelationship of treaties.
Id.
135. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 716. For the definition of anticipatory breach in the
international context, see BINDER, supra note 9.
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the issue of whether an anticipatory breach would nullify a treaty has yet
to be addressed, and there has been little speculation as to the consequences for two treaties that may breach in the future.136
In 1979, two parties were required to resolve a similar issue at the
Camp David negotiations over the Arab-Israeli conflict.137 In that instance, Egypt and Israel began the implementation of a plan that concluded with a treaty of peace, whereby Egypt agreed that Israel would
“live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.”138 In 1952,
though, Egypt sought leadership among Arab nations by “giving voice to
a Pan-Arab nationalist movement, at times even proposing to merge with
other Arab states.”139 Egypt’s commitment to the mission of the PanArab world had its foundation in a treaty between Egypt and the Arab
League that required Egypt to maintain collective security with Arab
governments and advance national aspirations of the Palestinian
people.140 Consequently, at the time Egypt and Israel submitted their
treaty to the United Nations for ratification, Egypt was “considered to be
under a continuing obligation to join in hostilities against Israel” but also
committed to not use force against Israel.141
The issue was hotly negotiated among Egypt and Israel, and they eventually submitted a side-letter with the agreement clarifying that each
would “exclude the use of force by either party against the other unless
the latter were deemed the aggressor in a conflict with third parties.”142
Yet, minutes to the negotiations reveal that the treaty was not intended to
abrogate defense obligations already in place for either party.143 Most
136. BINDER, supra note 9, at 3; see Borgen, supra note 47, at 627–28.
137. BINDER, supra note 9, at 3.
138. Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, Mar.
26, 1979, 18 I.L.M.; Agreement on the Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed
at Camp David preamble, Egypt-Isr., Sept. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1463, 1467; BINDER, supra note 9, at 3.
139. BINDER, supra note 9, at 10 (“Of great symbolic importance in this enterprise was
Egypt’s central role in expressing Arab hostility to Israel, in consequence of which it had
bore the brunt of every Arab hostility to Israel.”).
140. Id. at 3.
141. Id. at 11.
142. Id.
143. Louis René Beres, Prosecuting Iraqi Gulf War Crimes: Allied and Israeli Rights
Under International Law, 16 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 41, 62 n.70 (1992). Beres
notes:
A Minute to Article VI, paragraph 5 of the Israel-Egyptian Peace Treaty provides that it is agreed by the parties that there is no assertion that the Peace
Treaty prevails over other treaties or agreements or that other treaties or agreements prevail over the Peace Treaty. . . . This means that the treaty with Israel
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notably, this would include cooperative military agreements between
Syria and Egypt.144 So, while the side letter ostensibly set forth a standard for determining sides, the letter hardly corrected the problem since
“aggression, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder.”145 The problem of
determining aggression becomes more difficult when one reflects upon
the myriad border disputes and entitlements in the Israeli-Arab world.146
Despite these problems, the treaty is considered a success in terms of
Israeli-Egyptian relations, and still remains in effect today.147 The treaty
failed in other respects, however, as the members of the Arab League
responded with a unanimous vote to suspend Egypt from the Arab

does not prevail over the defense treaties that Egypt has concluded with Syria.
Should Egypt determine that Israel has undertaken aggression against Syria it
could enter into belligerency against Israel on behalf of Damascus.
Id.
144. BINDER, supra note 9, at 11. For a description of the Syria-Israel conflict, see
discussion infra Part IV.
145. BINDER, supra note 9, at 13; Louis René Beres, Preserving the Third Temple:
Israel’s Right of Anticipatory Self-Defense Under International Law, 26 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 111, 125 n.42 (1993). Beres explains:
Although it is generally believed that the peace treaty in force with Egypt
constrains that state from joining with other Arab forces against Israel, this belief causes problems. The Israel-Egyptian Peace Treaty provides that the parties
do not assert that the Peace Treaty prevails over other treaties or agreements or
that other treaties or agreements prevail over the Peace Treaty. This means that
the treaty with Israel does not prevail over the defense treaties that Egypt has
concluded with Syria, and that Cairo—should it determine that Israel has undertaken aggression against Syria—could enter into belligerency against Israel
on behalf of Damascus. Indeed, even if Syria were to commence hostilities
against Israel to recover the Golan Heights, Egypt might abrogate its agreement
with Israel and offer military assistance to Syria. Shortly after the signing of the
Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, then Egyptian Prime Minister Khalil stated that
he would regard any attempt by Syria to recover the Golan-Heights as a defensive war, one that would bring into play the Egyptian-Syrian defense treaty despite the existence of the Israel-Egyptian Peace Treaty.
Beres, supra, at 125 n.42.
146. See George Anastaplo, On Freedom: Explorations, 17 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
465, 612 (“[I]t is probably not difficult in the Middle East to invoke longstanding border
disputes in the course of the bargaining that any controversy promotes.”).
147. Bernard Gwertzman, 1979: A Glimmer of Peace, N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT, Dec. 13,
2004, at 22 (“Remarkably, though, despite continuing tensions in the region, the treaty
between Egypt and Israel has held . . . .”).
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League, having viewed the treaty as a violation of the Arab League’s
commitments in the Middle East.148
Therefore, the conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty and the
Friendship treaty remains an exposed doctrinal problem of treaty conflict
left largely unaddressed after the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty because of
Egypt’s removal from the Arab League and a stated reservation about the
Egypt-Syrian treaty.149 The potential for conflict is high among the postSoviet states for reasons that mirror the problems in the Middle East—
most notably, the dispute over the entitlement of certain lands and borders.150 Recently, these problems garnered national media attention when
Russia and Georgia engaged in military action over the South Ossetia
territory.151 Like Georgia’s dispute over South Ossetia, Ukraine’s tenuous relationship with Crimea is troubling given the latter’s dense Russian population and strategic location on the Black Sea.152

148. Borgen, supra note 47, at 627–28 (“Current analysis does not address the problem
of treaty conflicts [in terms of anticipatory breach]; as such it is not a developed norm.”);
see also BINDER, supra note 9, at 15.
149. See BINDER, supra note 9, at 15.
150. Zlenko, supra note 8, at 45–46. Zlenko explains:
Radical social and political movements in Central and Eastern Europe during
the late 1980s and early 1990s . . . , the emergence on the political landscape of
several independent states each striving to obtain its own model of social development, and the collapse of the Soviet Union have all drastically altered the
geopolitical balance in Europe. . . .
The dramatic events taking place in Europe have raised a number of new issues, the most significant of which are the need to maintain further political
balance in the region and the need to ensure the security of the newly independent countries by creating an effective security system throughout the entire
Euro-Atlantic region.
Id. at 45.
151. Ellen Barry & Alan Cowell, Ossetia Leader Unclear on Goal for Russia Ties,
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 12. 2008, at 8; Judy Dempsey, NATO Envoys Will Offer Their
Support in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A12.
152. Crimea is a hot bed for entitlement problems. For more information on Crimea,
see Chase, supra note 2. There are significant differences, though, between South Ossetia
and Crimea. Most significantly, South Ossetia is internationally regarded as a sovereign
territory, while Crimea is an autonomous, parliamentary republic of Ukraine. It is not
under formal dispute that Crimea is subject to Ukrainian authority. However, similiarities exists due to the terroritory’s proximity to Russia and questions of legitimacy. Some
Russian nationalists question whether Crimea was legitimately transferred to Ukriane in
1954. Furthermore, the existence of a large Russian population and the presence of the
Port Sevastopol, home of the Black Sea Fleet, make Crimea a volitle territory. For more
on the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine, see the International Committee for Crimea, Trans-
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The Friendship Treaty imposes on Ukraine a duty to perform according
to the principle pacta sunt servanda, which dictates that treaties must be
performed in good faith.153 This principle bars parties from concluding
agreements that undermine the value of existing treaties on the same subject.154 To avoid breaching good faith, Parties entering a new treaty must
avoid obligations that frustrate or destroy their other treaty-made obligations.155 Therefore, to conclude a treaty that entails obligations that
would forseeably frustrate the rights of a third party156 may ultimately be
a type of anticipatory breach and, thus, a breach of good faith.157
It is necessary, then, to analyze whether the North Atlantic Treaty
would frustrate the object and purpose of the Friendship Treaty, and, if
so, whether such frustration amounts to a material breach of the Friendship Treaty. The scope of the Friendship Treaty’s obligations can be defined by utilizing the interpretative framework established by the
VCLT.158 The text of the Friendship Treaty states in part:
If a situation arises which, in the opinion of one of the High Contracting Parties, poses a threat to peace, violates the peace or affects the interests of its national security, sovereignty or territorial integrity, it may
propose to the other High Contracting Party that consultations on the
subject be held without delay. The States shall exchange relevant information and, if necessary, carry out coordinated or joint measures
with a view to overcoming the situation.159

This clause creates an obligatory norm.160 The right to cooperate must
be asserted, as it does not arise automatically when either state has a

fer of the Crimea to the Ukraine (2005), http://www.iccrimea.org/historical/
crimeatransfer.html, and see also Chase, supra note 2.
153. See Janis, supra note 12, at 27. “Every treaty in force is binding upon all the parties to it and must be performed in good faith. The notion of good faith and observance of
international agreements is, of course, a fundamental principle of international law.”
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 26.
154. See BINDER, supra note 9, at 28 (“Any act which destroys the value of a treaty
right is a breach of the obligation to perform a treaty in good faith.”).
155. LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 550 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1961). In discussing the good faith requirement, Lord McNair notes, “In short, the making of regulations by one party which in substance destroyed or frustrated the right of the other party
would be a breach of good faith and of the treaty.” Id.
156. “Third party,” here, refers to a third party with whom one has already contracted.
157. BINDER, supra note 9, at 28.
158. See supra text accompanying note 76.
159. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, supra note 6, art. 7.
160. See SADAT-AKHAVI, supra note 58, at 8 (describing situations in which a norm
requires an act, while another norm permits a contrary act—two acts that cannot be performed at the same time, but can both be avoided).
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claim for a threat to its territorial integrity, but when that right is asserted, the other party “shall” meet and exchange information.161 Analyzing the treaty as a whole, though, the clause does not just create an obligation to discuss mutual defense possibilities in the time of an attack—
rather, it suggests a procedure for the overall intent and purpose of the
treaty, stated in the preamble:
Considering that the strengthening of friendly relations, goodneighborliness and mutually advantageous cooperation is in keeping
with the basic interests of their peoples and serves the cause of peace
and international security . . . .
Desiring to improve the quality of these relations and strengthen
their legal basis . . . .162

The second and third schools of interpretation—intentionalism and
purposevisim—can help in determining the “value” of the treaty when
the text is ambiguous or unclear.163 Due to the broad language used in the
Friendship treaty, supplemental information is helpful to define its object
and purpose.164 Interpreting a treaty in a way that acknowledges the fundamental problem the drafters sought to address clarifies the object and
purpose of the treaty.165 For Ukraine, the Friendship Treaty was intended
as a declaration of independence and sovereignty—a major step toward
achieving self-determination and official recognition by Russia.166 For
Russia, it seems that the drive behind the Friendship Treaty was twofold;
while Russia surely wanted to maintain its diplomatic relationship with
Ukraine, it also worried about solidifying its position at the strategic naval base in Sevastopol (a Ukrainian municipality located in the Black
Sea).167 The Sevastopol naval base is attractive because its location allows for quick deployment to all the surrounding territories, and, up until
the signing of the Friendship Treaty, its status as a Russian-friendly port

161. Id.
162. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, supra note 6.
163. Moore, supra note 28, at 919. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur to the
International Law Commission, proposed that a fundamental breach “goes to the root or
foundation of the treaty relationship between the parties and call[s] in question the continued value or possibility of that relationship in the particular field covered by the treaty.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
164. See supra text accompanying note 76.
165. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 35; see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
supra note 12, art. 60.
166. Specter, supra note 106.
167. Feldhusen, supra note 2, at 127.
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was unclear.168 Therefore, the object and purpose of the treaty was to
increase stability and cooperation in the Eastern European region by fostering diplomatic relations between the two states and fortifying the
Black Sea Fleet.
Similarly, the North Atlantic Treaty seeks to maintain security and
peace throughout Europe and the Atlantic region, and, if necessary, to
guarantee a framework of concerted military action when any of the
members suffers an armed attack.169 In part, it states:
The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them . . .
[is] an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such
an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of an individual or collective self-defense . . . , will assist the Party or Parties
so attacked by taking . . . in concert with the other Parties, such action
as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.170

It seems clear that the object and purpose of these two treaties conflict;
both call for cooperative military action or cooperative efforts to defend
territorial integrity of their parties.171 In context, when one requires an
act, the other necessarily requires a contrary act.172 These conflicting obligations “cannot be performed at the same time,” however, “both can be
avoided.”173 Potentially, performance of its obligations under the Friendship Treaty could prohibit Ukraine from performing its obligations under
the North Atlantic Treaty; but there are numerous scenarios in which

168. Id at 126; Andrew E. Kramer, NATO Ships in Black Sea Raise Alarms in Russia,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2008, at A16.
169. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 129, preamble; LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN, THE
UNITED STATES AND NATO, THE FORMATIVE YEARS 1–10 (1984) (stating that the purpose
of NATO was to increase American influence in Europe in order to maintain peace and
stability amidst the threat of communism after World War II).
170. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 129, art. 5.
171. Borgen, supra note 47, at 580. In regard to treaties that are concerned with the
same subject matter for instance:
NAFTA and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) cover much
of the same subject-matter, although GATT covers many other subject as well.
Similarly, one can see that the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights essentially cover
the same subject-matter as well. While a case could be made either way, the
stronger argument is that these treaties would meet any reasonable test for
“same subject matter.”
Id.
172. See SADAT-AKHAVI, supra note 58, at 8.
173. Id. (emphasis added).
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conflict is avoidable.174 Still, the guidance set forth by the “Successive
Treaties” conflict resolution principles in the VCLT does not provide an
adequate solution for these types of conflicts.175 To follow the VCLT
strictly, Ukraine would be required to abide the earlier treaty in the event
of a conflict, yet commentators have noted that in reality there is no way
of determining or preventing the fulfillment of one obligation over the
other.176 We are confronted, then, with the same problems anticipated by
political realism. Without a clear framework of obligations, the state will
be free to employ realist foreign policy and make choices based on selfinterest instead of international legal compliance.177
V. THE PROPOSED REMEDY
With unsatisfactory procedures in place, it is important for Ukraine and
Russia to settle on other means for resolving a foreseeable dispute.178
Theoretically, there are three tactics Ukraine may employ in order to
avoid liability for a breach. First, when the Friendship Treaty expires,
Ukraine could terminate the agreement in accordance with its built-in
termination clause:

174. For example, cases where NATO allies and Russia are not involved in a military
conflict.
175. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 30. In regard to the
“Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject matter,” the VCLT merely
provides that
When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier
one:
...
(b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of
the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual
rights and obligations.”
Id; see also BINDER, supra note 9, at 3 (“A review of the practice of states and international tribunals in instances of treaty conflict will reveal a pattern of avoiding the question of conflicting treaties.”); SADAT-AKHAVI, supra note 58, at 60 (noting that the conflict passages of the VCLT leave many questions unanswered); Borgen, supra note 47, at
578.
176. See SADAT-AKHAVI, supra note 58, at 64.
177. Borgen, supra note 47, at 589. The problem with the interpretation of pacta sunt
servanda is that, in the event of conflicts where treaties of the same object and purpose
conflict, the theory would “thus give the state the choice and risk of beaching either or
both treaties depending on the obligations of the treaties and the state’s actions. This
opens the door to state responsibility and places the burdens on the potentially breaching
state or states to negotiate a solution.” Id.
178. Id.

2010]

UKRAINE, RUSSIA, AND NATO

621

This Treaty is concluded for a period of 10 years. It shall subsequently be extended automatically for further 10-year periods unless
one of the High Contracting Parties notifies the other High Contracting
Party in writing of its desire to terminate it at least six months before
the expiry of the current 10-year period.179

In doing so, Ukraine may avoid the legal complications presented by
signing the North Atlantic Treaty, but Ukriaine would also be taking a
damaging step backward in diplomatic relations with Russia, a nation
with whom Ukraine has a long history and strong social ties.180 Additionally, Ukraine has a large Russian population,181 and, amidst the present
chaos within Ukraine’s government,182 it is unlikely that any political
party would advocate such a strong showing of Russian dissent. Moreover, the object and purpose of the Friendship Treaty was for Russia to
explicitly recognize Ukraine’s independence and borders; to renounce
the document that ostensibly grants such recognition would be counterintuitive for a nation still progressing toward complete sovereignty. Therefore, while this might be an easy legal resolution, the political contingencies make it grossly unattractive.
The second way Ukraine may be able to avoid liability for a breach is
by asserting an ergo omnes rights defense—Ukraine could claim that
since every nation has an interest in self-preservation, and since joining a
military alliance furthers this interest, doing so served a fundamentally
justifiable priority.183 The notion of ergo omnes was elucidated by the
ICJ in the case of Barcelona Traction:
When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals, whether natural or juristic persons, it is bound to extend to them
the protection of the law and assumes obligations concerning the treatment to be afforded them. These obligations, however, are neither absolute nor unqualified. In particular, an essential distinction should be
179. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, supra note 6, art. 40.
180. Feldhusen, supra note 2, at 119; Morrison, supra note 2, at 682.
181. Dempsey, supra note 123.
182. Steven Erlanger & Steven Lee Myers, Bush Adds Drama to NATO Summit,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Apr. 3, 2008, at 13.
183. BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 23. Bederman explains:
[T]here are some rules of custom that are so significant . . . that the international community will not suffer States to “contract” out of them by treaty. . . .
[S]ome customary international law obligations are so significant that the international community will permit any State to claim for their violations . . . .
These are erga omnes principles.
Id. “Erga” and “ergo” are used interchangeably by commentators, but this Note uses “ergo” for simplicity.
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drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international
community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the
field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the
concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved,
all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they
are obligations erga omnes.184

In short, ergo omnes obligations are those obligations for which “all
States have a legal interest” in fulfillment, “by reason of the importance
of their subject-matter for the international community.”185 The Barcelona Traction case singled out slavery, genocide, and racial discrimination
as violations ergo omnes—violations of preemptory norms that states
have a duty to refrain from irrespective of any treaty, because the obligatory duty of compliance is understood as being owed to the international
community as a whole.186 Commentators, though, have found that the
notion of the preemptory norm exceeds pure human rights obligations
and also includes the right of a state to maintain international peace and
cooperation.187 This includes the right to maintain peace and security on
an international scale—a principle that arguably includes a nation’s ability to join a military alliance such as NATO.188 The VCLT reflects this
184. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5, 1970).
185. See SADAT-AKHAVI, supra note 58, at 55.
186. Alex Glasshauser, What We Must Never Forget When It is a Treaty We are Expounding, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1290 n.289 (2005).
187. J.D. van der Vyver, Statehood in International Law, 5 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 9, 73
(1991). Van der Vyver explains:
[Tunkin], on this basis, classified the peremptory norms of general international
law under three fundamental principles of the U.N. Charter: The principle of
peaceful coexistence; the principle of maintaining international peace, which
includes the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force; and the
general principle of international cooperation, which includes the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples and the principle of respect for
human rights.
Id.
188. Id. Van der Vyver goes on to note:
Alexidze, took note of a wider range of U.N. practice and consequently included in his classification of peremptory norms of general international law a
broader scope of fundamental norms. Those norms entail, according to him:
....
(b) principles defending the peace and security of nations (which include prohibition of the use and the threat of the use of force).
Id.
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sentiment in maintaining that a treaty is void if it conflicts with a
preemptory norm of general international law,189 but the argument for
ergo omnes obligations in the present case is attenuated and likely poses
an affront to the prevailing international principle that treaties are to be
respected.190 Moreover, the Friendship Treaty does not bar Ukraine from
furthering its defense mechanisms; rather, the problem is the foreseeable
confusion that would result if a NATO ally were to attack Russia. Therefore, it is unlikely that a court would find that the Friendship Treaty violates a preemptory norm of international law.191
Ukraine’s third option would be to enter into negotiations with Russia
and submit a side letter to the United Nations amending and clarifying
the obligations set forth in the current Friendship Treaty.192 This option
seems best, as it would preserve the purposes of the Friendship Treaty on
a political level and also help secure the legal obligations of both parties
in the future.193 Furthermore, according to Article 37, this was the method of resolution agreed upon at the ratification of the Friendship Treaty:
189. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 53.
190. Recall that the principle pacta sunt servanda requires that treaties be performed in
good faith, and in reality, nearly every obligation prohibits a state from exercising its
sovereignty in one form or another. See BINDER, supra note 9, at 1 (“The modern international legal system rests on a paradox—its legitimacy derives from the sovereignty of
nations, yet its function is the constraint of such sovereignty.”).
191. Asserting a defense of a breach by relying on an ergo omnes obligation seems to
require a more significant right. If there is a treaty obligation that bars a state from complying with a universal norm of international law, this would be a better argument for
ergo omnes violation. See Dinah Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles
on State Responsibility, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 833, 844 (2002) (noting that the discussion of
preemptory norms in modern international jurisprudence and arbitration is largely absent,
and the main signifier of its presence lies in the VCLT). Here, though, there does not
appear to be an explicit bar to Ukraine, but rather a foreseeable situation that would
present dual, conflicting obligations. Meanwhile, according to Bodansky:
[T]he commentary and most authors on the subject essentially contend that peremptory rules exist because they are needed, i.e., to “prohibit what has come
to be seen as intolerable because of the threat it presents to the survival of
States and their peoples and the most basic human values.”
Id. (internal citations omitted).
192. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 39 (“A treaty may
be amended by agreement between the parties. The rules laid down in Part II apply to
such an agreement except in so far as the treaty may otherwise provide.”).
193. There will undoubtedly be difficulty in crafting an amendment that is both enticing to the parties and sufficient for all foreseeable outcomes. Similar problems arose in
the Camp David negotiations, where crafting language free of manipulative or difficult
interpretation was nearly an impossible feat. See BINDER, supra note 9, at 13.
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Disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Treaty shall be settled through consultations and negotiations between the High Contracting Parties.194

While parties have a largely “uncontroversial”195 prerogative to negotiate amendments to their agreements, the chief foreseeable problem is
that severe complications will arise nevertheless if the parties fail to engage in negotiations preemptively—that is, prior to a dispute actually
arising. It would likely make more sense for Ukraine to outline reservations with NATO, eluding an obligation to cooperate in a military effort
against Russia in the case of a NATO strike against a Russian territory.
This reservation, though, should clearly express Ukraine’s unwillingness
to participate in the military effort on either side, as Ukraine would have
to abstain from joining efforts with Russia against a NATO ally.
CONCLUSION
“Uncertainty is a calculable cost that treaties operate to decrease.”196
These words echo the positivist warnings first written by Grotius, that
“all things become uncertain the moment men depart from law.”197 As it
presently stands, the VCLT is wholly inadequate for dealing with the
recent proliferation of treaties as a substantial source of international
law.198 This Note calls on Russia and Ukraine to meet and discuss brightline conditions for triggering Ukraine’s military cooperative obligations
in the event of an action by a NATO ally that threatens Russia’s territorial integrity.
Ultimately, the international legal system needs to develop a framework for dealing with anticipatory breaches of treaties. A foreign policy
that promotes clarity and transparency with respect to obligations would
further the positivist agenda toward enhancing compliance and respect
for international law; this is a necessity a fortiori when military action is

194. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, supra note 6, art. 37. Issues
regarding the Black Sea Fleet lease are already starting to arise. See Kramer, supra note
168.
195. Michael Bowman, Towards a Unified Treaty Body for Monitoring Compliance
with UN Human Rights Conventions? Legal Mechanisms for Treaty Reform, 7 HUM. RTS.
L. REV. (Special issue) 225, 235 (2007) (“[R]ules governing the revision of treaties are to
be found in Part IV of the Vienna Convention (Articles 39–41), which are unlikely to be
regarded as controversial.”).
196. BINDER, supra note 9, at 31.
197. See WRIGHT, supra note 28.
198. Borgen, supra note 47, at 578 (“[T]he VCLT’s treaty conflict provisions are neither an accurate description of current state practice, nor are they adequate prescriptions
for how states should act.”).
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the basis of a dispute.199 Over time, unforeseeable events can drastically
alter the course of international relations. Bright-line obligations are necessary when one’s ally has the potential to become an enemy in the future.
David G. Buffa*

199. BINDER, supra note 9, at 31 (“In the realm of politics and war, uncertainty is even
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